Macro, Fiscal and Decentralization Options to Address Marginality and Reach the Extremely Poor by S. Ehtisham Ahmad
303J. von Braun and F.W. Gatzweiler (eds.), Marginality: Addressing the Nexus 
of Poverty, Exclusion and Ecology, DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-7061-4_18,
© The Author(s) 2014
 Abstract  Reaching the extremely poor and marginal groups in countries where 
local politicians and offi cials have little incentive to provide for them is a challenge 
to addressing marginality in many countries. Financial and taxation arrangements, 
information constraints, and institutional aspects between central and local govern-
ments to address these challenges are identifi ed in this chapter. The instruments 
that might be involved include a range of options, from transfers or assistance from 
higher levels of government (donors), cash support, or the provision of public services 
(particularly health care and education), other forms of income or employment support, 
to assistance for small-scale enterprises. In this chapter the author concludes that in 
the absence of genuine local interest in providing for the marginalized and extremely 
poor, direct provision of funding by central governments and aid agencies appears to 
be the main feasible option. 
 Keywords  Fiscal policy •  Marginality •  Poverty •  Transfers •  Decentralization 
18.1  Introduction 
 How does one reach the extremely poor and marginal groups in countries where local 
politicians and offi cials may have little incentive to provide for them? This lack of 
incentive may be because these groups are minorities in these areas, either due to 
ethnicity, language, or caste. In other cases these groups may be predominantly 
women and/or children who are not be able to vote and thus exert political pressure 
on local politicians (e.g., in some very traditional societies). 
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 The diffi culty for a central government in reaching the extremely poor may be 
that it may not have adequate information on the relevant groups, and/or may have 
limited ability to provide benefi ts directly. Providing assistance through tied 
transfers to local governments may incur the risk that there could be a diversion of 
resources to other interests by local offi cials or politicians. In other cases, even the 
central government may not have the best interests of the extremely poor in mind, 
and external aid from foreign governments or altruistic foundations may be subject 
to capture and diversion at both the national and local levels of government. 
 Even in some of the more advanced developing countries, with the possible 
exception of Brazil, weak institutional arrangements and inadequate public fi nan-
cial management systems limit information fl ows regarding what is spent, by which 
level of government, and what the results were. Another aspect contributing to weak 
governance arises when local governments do not have access to adequate “own- 
source revenues.” 1 Under such circumstances incentives to divert resources are 
magnifi ed if the implementation of benefi t programs for the extremely poor is 
handled by local governments, but higher levels of government, or donors, provide 
the fi nancing. 
 A typical problem is when there is an altruistic benefactor, whether a central 
government or an external agency, that lacks adequate information on the target 
benefi ciaries. Examples of such groups could include the Baka and other indige-
nous tribes of the West African rainforest, or girls and women in the northwestern 
regions of Pakistan. The relevant information on the target groups may be more 
easily available at local levels, where government offi cials do not necessarily assign 
particular importance to the marginalized or extremely poor groups. The problem 
can be mitigated, although not eliminated, when the vulnerable groups have a 
tradition of political action, or have existing legal or constitutional protection such 
as with the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes in India (Gajwani and Zhang 
 2008 ; Palaniswamy and Krishnan  2008 ). 
 The extremely poor or marginal groups typically do not qualify for categorical 
insurance-type benefi ts, including pensions or unemployment insurance, if they have 
not participated in the formal labor force. Their marginality may also constrain their 
ability to participate in adequately remunerated informal activities, or to have equal 
access to local public services, including basic health care and education. Marginalized 
groups often live in remote areas and/or have little education or assets (von Braun 
et al.  2009 ), which is clearly the case with the Baka tribes (World Bank  2011 ). 
 Given the importance of institutional structures and associated infl uence on 
incentives to divert resources, I focused here on a typology of options. This high-
lights some of the preconditions that are needed in order to provide effectively for 
the most marginal groups. The instruments that might be involved include a range 
1 
 This is defi ned as some control over revenues at the margin (more likely with respect to the rate 
structure than the base). It does not follow that the need for local own-revenues implies that there 
should be local administration, indeed even for local property taxes. The cadastre may have to 




of options, from transfers or assistance from higher levels of government (donors) 
translated into cash support, or the provision of public services (particularly health 
care and education), forms of income or employment support, to assistance for small-
scale enterprises. 
 The alternative delivery mechanisms examined here include a spectrum ranging 
from:
•  Direct provisions by local governments with their own resources—this generally 
works best if the local governments are interested in the welfare of the marginal 
groups, which may not be the case 
•  Provisions by local governments with earmarked fi nancing from higher levels of 
government or donors—this may involve more or less conditionality on the 
processes and procedures to reach the target groups 
•  Direct provision by the central government and parallel provision by donors/
NGOs 
18.2  Better Governance and Incentive Structures—Hard 
Budget Constraints 
 Well-meaning assistance for the marginalized groups, either from a central govern-
ment or external donors, without proper attention to the overall institutional 
framework and fi scal instruments may reduce incentives for effi cient provision and 
worsen existing governance structures. It may also reduce the political discipline 
that comes through operating under hard budget constraints. In this section I focus 
on the overall institutional and fi scal framework. I also address the interactions 
between instruments, particularly social provision and fi nancing mechanisms. The 
overall effectiveness relies on complete and accurate information, effective gover-
nance, and accountability. 
18.2.1  Fiscal Instruments and Preferences 
 Donors, including international agencies and political activists, are increasingly trying 
to hold local or subnational governments accountable for the effective delivery of 
public services—be those basic health care or primary education of marginalized 
groups, or the effective implementation of targeted public works programs [like the 
Indian National Rural Employment Guarantee (NREGA)]. The diffi culty in many 
cases is that it is not clear which level of government holds the functional responsi-
bility and whether this level has control over all the needed economic inputs (e.g., 
employees, wages, operations, maintenance, capital spending) that translate into 
programs or sub-programs that can be assessed, such that the cost-effectiveness of 
the performance might be measured. Focusing solely on outcomes is not suffi cient 
in terms of assigning responsibility and achieving cost-effective operations. 
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 Typically, as in countries as diverse as Bolivia and Cameroon, or even in 
Pakistan, 2 local governments do not have full responsibility over program functions 
or sub-functions. This translates into inadequate control over the economic 
 categories—wages and salaries, hiring and fi ring decisions—related to the devolved 
functional responsibilities (e.g., basic education). Yet specifi c health programs or 
activities such as building schools are often assigned to local governments that do 
not have the full associated economic or functional responsibility. For example in 
Cameroon (World Bank  2011 ) recent attempts to make municipal governments 
responsible for the construction of additional schools or clinics, without the corre-
sponding responsibility for providing primary education or basic health care ser-
vices, make it easy for the local government to evade responsibility or accountability 
for outcomes. It is quite easy to blame another level of government for the lack of 
teachers or health care personnel. A system of overlapping responsibilities cannot 
be easily overcome through social action or political sanctions for nonperformance. 
 The linkages between functions and how these might be implemented are seen in 
representations of the typical classifi cation of the budget process (see Table  18.1 ), 
depicting the intersection between functions and sub-functions (rows), and the 
inputs classifi ed by economic categories and administrative arrangements (columns). 
The responsibilities of lower levels of government appear in designated cells, but 
not along the rows (functions) or the columns (economic or administrative categories). 
With this pattern of responsibility, it is hard for an electorate to hold government 
 Table 18.1  Typical sub-national spending assignments by functions and economic categories as 
well as administrative arrangements 
 Economic classifi cation 
 Administrative 
classifi cation 
 Functions  Wages  Other current  Capital 





 Primary  CCCC  CCCCC  CCCC M  CCCCC  CCCCC M 
 Secondary  CCCC  CCCCC  CCCC  CCCCC  CCCCC 
 Health care 
 Basic care clinics  CCCC  CCCCC  CCCC M  CCCC  CCCCCC M 
 Water  CCCC  CCCCC  CCCC M  CCCC  CCCCC M 
 Sanitation  CCCC  CCCCC  CCCC M  CCCC  CCCCC M 
 Within each broad economic, functional, and administrative grouping, there are several additional 
functions that are represented by the full economic classifi cation (see IMF  2001 , Government 
Financial Statistics Manual), or the UN Classifi cation of the Functions of Government (COFOG). 
For instance, we only identify basic preventive health care as a typical local function in advanced 
countries, but here it is split as in most developing countries 
 C represents a central assignment and M represents a municipal assignment 
2 
 During the 2001–2007 period devolution to districts was attempted by the Musharraf administration 




responsible for the provision of basic health care, primary education, or even potable 
water and sanitation services. 3 In the cases presented in Table  18.1 , the municipal 
government would be responsible for the construction of a school or clinic without 
having full responsibility for providing the primary education or basic preventive 
care function or sub-function. This makes it easy for the local government to evade 
responsibility or accountability for outcomes—as it is quite easy to blame another 
level of government for the lack of teachers or health care personnel.
18.2.2  Financing 
 At the margin, fi nancing mechanisms also matter—both regarding bases over which 
the local government has some control (the own-source revenues mentioned below), 
the design of transfers from higher levels of government, as well as access to credit. 
Poor design in one or more of the dimensions can override any clarifi cation of 
spending responsibilities, underlining the importance of interactions across instru-
ments. The lack of accountability at subnational levels often mirrors that found at 
the national level (e.g., for countries such as Pakistan). Jurisdictions can become 
accustomed to relying on transfers and capital infl ows, with little incentive to use 
the tax handles that may be available to meet their responsibilities and particularly 
to deal with defi cits. 
18.2.2.1  Own Taxes 
 From a political economy perspective, the use of own taxes at the margin is critical 
for ensuring that the electorates of a locality, region, or country hold governments 
responsible for their spending. It is through the need to raise additional revenues to 
meet spending needs that there is a clearer political linkage between spending and 
fi nancing. This is clearest in the case of debt incurred. Without the ability to raise 
additional revenues in order to meet future repayments and liabilities, a local 
government is able to pass liability on to the central or other government levels 
and related sanctions are just not credible (Ambrosiano and Bordignon  2006 ). 
In such cases there are no hard budget constraints or accountability for spending. 
 Typically in developing countries there has been relatively little focus on design-
ing adequate sources of subnational own-source revenues (see Ahmad and Brosio 
 2006 ,  2009 for a discussion of developing countries). Split bases, such as the Goods 
and Services Tax on services in Pakistan are not generally workable, as the crediting 
and refunding mechanisms are diffi cult to handle by subnational governments 
3 
 For a description of the internationally accepted standard for the full structure of the economic 
classifi cation system, see IMF ( 2001 ) and the UN’s COFOG for the functional classifi cation. The 
latter tends to correspond to functions or sub-functions for health care or basic education. 
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without central coordination and multiple rates make the system even more complex 
and open up the possibility of tax wars (Ahmad  2010 ). Alternatives include dual 
Value Added Taxes 4 (Bird  2010 )—without the establishment of complex adminis-
trations—giving some control to local authorities. 
 At the local or municipal level, property or land taxes are suitable handles to 
generate accountability, but the implementation is patchy (see Ahmad and Brosio 
 2009 for a review in Latin America). It should be stressed that control over tax rates 
or bases does not require that each level of government establish its own tax adminis-
tration. All that is required is that the local jurisdiction be able principally to set its 
own tax rates. 5 
 Another alternative is to consider piggybacked income taxes that would also 
operate with a single administration. However, this will tend to provide more 
revenues to the richest localities, and needs to be supplemented by equalization 
mechanisms to permit local governments to be able to provide similar levels of 
public services at similar levels of tax effort. 
18.2.2.2  Shared Taxes 
 Tax sharing is quite common and often helps with overall fi nancing needs. Tax 
sharing may also be needed for political economy purposes, especially in natural 
resource sectors, to prevent centrifugal forces and to help pacify separatist tenden-
cies—as in the case of the sharing of forestry revenues in Cameroon (Morrison et al. 
 2009 ; Oyono et al.  2009 ; Cerutti et al.  2010 ; Pye-Smith  2010 ). However, such tax 
sharing does not constitute own-source revenues, as additional revenues cannot be 
generated independently if needed and it does not promote more effi cient governance. 
Further, tax sharing does little to support incentives to provide for minorities, such 
as the Baka. In this regard tax-sharing revenues are very much like untied transfers, 
which are described below. 
18.2.2.3  Transfer Design—Gap Filling Fiscal Dentistry? 
 Defi cit-fi lling transfers negate a recipient jurisdiction’s incentives to use own-source 
revenue handles. If defi cits are automatically met from higher levels or donors, as 
was widespread in the Indian subcontinent (see Rao  1998 , who referred to this 
phenomenon as fi scal dentistry), there can be little accountability or effi ciency 
in spending on or targeting vulnerable groups. It can be dangerous when central 
4 
 Typically these involve joint occupancy of the same base, with separate tax rate setting powers. 
This does not always involve separate administrations. 
5 
 In unitary states this may involve setting rates within a band legislated at a higher level. In Mexico, 
although the constitution is federal with respect to the federal government and the states; the states 




governments play this game, as has been the case in Pakistan over the past couple of 
decades, given its periodic strategic importance. This has led to psychological 
dependency, poor governance, and aversion to paying taxes (Ahmad  2010 ). External 
assistance, including for humanitarian purposes, has reinforced these tendencies. 
18.2.2.4  Equalization Transfers 
 Equalization or untied transfers help to meet local government preferences, without 
discriminating against regions with low revenue potential or distorting incentives. 
Such transfers are desirable in order to supplement own-source revenues, which may 
be largely concentrated in the richer areas with more signifi cant revenue bases and are 
generally quite disequalizing. But will the local politicians have the incentive to pro-
vide for the marginal groups in the presence of equalization transfers? The short 
answer is that local governments will probably not provide for such groups out of 
untied resources, and that is one of the contributing factors to marginality problems. 
18.2.2.5  Earmarked Transfers 
 Earmarked transfers are often recommended to meet the objectives of donors or the 
central government, specifying conditions that must be fulfi lled in order to benefi t 
from the funds. In some cases, co-fi nancing requirements are also specifi ed. 
However, this discriminates against the poorest regions that may not be able to 
collect the transfers due to lower than average tax-raising capacity. 
 With poor information fl ows on how funds are allocated or accounted for and the 
more complex requirements on the outcomes of the spending, the possibility for a 
diversion of resources is higher. In the absence of proper benchmarks on spending 
and costs across regions and local governments, even social action and the mobili-
zation of public opinion (as is being attempted in relation to the Indian public works 
program NREGA in several states) may not be suffi cient. 
 Given that results-based budgeting is an advanced institutional arrangement that 
operates mainly in developed countries, withholding funds until the results are dem-
onstrated—the approach now being tried by development partners such as the UK’s 
DFID in some countries—may be quite unrealistic. The sanction of withholding 
funds in future years may work for investment spending in a repeated games con-
text—if there is both horizontal and inter-temporal competition for funds (Ahmad 
 2009 ). However, for basic health care or education services for the most vulnerable 
the sanction of withholding funds in future years may not be credible. 
18.2.2.6  Tracking the Funds and Establishing Hard Budget Constraints 
 The effectiveness of provision depends crucially on incentives that the providers may 
or may not have to actually spend the funding effi ciently and towards the desired 
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objectives. This depends, as argued above, on some clarity in terms of what these 
objectives and responsibilities might be—especially the functional responsibilities 
and associated economic components. Tracking these systematically is critical and 
a weakness of governance in many countries. The IMF’s Government Financial 
Statistics Manual  2001 and the UN’s Classifi cation of the Functions of Government 
(COFOG) are essential standards in terms of budgeting, charting of accounts, and 
tracking spending. 
 Tracking funds is also critical, and a typical mechanism used for this purpose is 
a Treasury Single Account (TSA)—which consolidates all the government’s cash 
and provides a trail of how the funds are disbursed and to whom. If there are lots of 
pots of funds in different bank accounts of various agencies, or donor tracking 
becomes too diffi cult, the government loses sight of what is being spent for which 
public objective. 
 Donors frequently do not trust national government budgeting systems and 
prefer to establish their own fund allocation mechanisms, as well as associated bank 
accounts. This situation has been particularly chaotic in Afghanistan, and has led to 
diffi culties in other countries as distinct as Bolivia and Timor-Leste. The absence of 
complete information on the funds available also makes it very diffi cult to initiate 
social action on the use of funds or to allow the operation of the discipline of yard-
stick competition. 
 It is possible to use a modifi ed TSA concept for improving the tracking of spending, 
especially for lower levels of government and donor agencies. This involves funds 
fl owing into special “correspondent accounts” within the TSA for local govern-
ments and specifi c donors. The treasury then stipulates spending limits for zero- 
balance accounts in the name of the donor or local government—these accounts 
continue to operate such as before—but the funds only fl ow overnight and there are 
no outstanding balances in these accounts. This provides the government with com-
plete information on spending, as well as more effi cient fi nancial management. The 
donors and local governments operate with their own procedures and safeguards. 
Figure  18.1 illustrates a simple correspondent account system within a national 
TSA, serving both a hypothetical local government (LG1) and donor agency (TDA).
 The main advantage of the modifi ed TSA arrangement for local governments is 
the timely and verifi ed generation of complete information on spending for each 
local government entity on a consistent basis, facilitating effective cash manage-
ment and creating an electronic trail of payments made. Often as in Cameroon and 
indeed Mexico (which also does not use a TSA—see Ahmad  in process ), and with 
disparate and varying standards for budget classifi cation and reporting in different 
jurisdictions, the consolidated accounts of local governments are only available 
with a considerable lag time of 3 years or more, and are generally not comparable 
across local governments. 
 Without basic information on economic and functional classifi cations as well as 
the TSA, it is very diffi cult to generate accurate and standardized information on 
who spends what amount and for what purpose or when. The question of what 
actually happens to the money and how effectively it results in improvements in 
living standards or health outcomes is a subsequent and more diffi cult stage that 
presupposes that information on the basic inputs and outputs is available and that 
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standard cost-effectiveness assessments are possible. For social action in the manner 
being attempted for NREGA, or yardstick competition, both sets of information are 
needed. Reliance by donors solely on evaluation of outcomes is likely to be unrealistic 
when basic spending information is not available. 
 Arrears and the buildup of debt liabilities are also mechanisms that are guaranteed 
to lead to ineffi cient outcomes at the local level. In this manner the local adminis-
trations are able to shift their liabilities on to future generations, the central govern-
ment, donors, or to other jurisdictions. The inter-linkages between policy instruments 
are most clearly defi ned in this case. Without clarity on spending responsibilities, as 
well as access to own-source revenues, sanctions on local governments for nonper-
formance or breach of debt limits are not likely to be credible. 
18.3  Decentralized Provision and Political Economy 
 If the transfer or funds made available for a particular purpose are of a “one-time” 
nature, the possibility of capture by local vested interests becomes quite acute, espe-
cially if there are broad disbursements and infl uence, and the intended marginalized 
benefi ciaries have relatively little voice in local government operations (Bardhan 
Chart1, Local government and
donor use of correspondent













 Fig. 18.1  Local government and donor use of correspondent accounts linked to a Treasury Single 
Account. LG1 is a local government, TDA is a typical donor agency, C/A is a correspondent 
account within the TSA, and ZBA is a zero-balance account in a commercial bank, which can be 
operated by either the local government or donor. The ministry of fi nance (MOF) or treasury estab-
lishes spending limits for the ZBA as a function of local government revenues received, or funds 
provided by the donor, permitting the local government or TDA to draw from the ZBA up to this 
amount. All information for spending is transmitted through the TSA to the MOF, which is able to 
produce timely reports on what has actually been spent and for what purpose (Provided that stan-
dard formats and classifi cations are followed) 
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 2006 ). Repeated targeted transfers also run the risk of being either being appropri-
ated by local offi cials or used by donor governments for political purposes, resulting 
in what is now being increasingly recognized as “clientelism,” especially if the 
information on who spends what and for what purpose is hard to attain. 
 The design of some recent social protection schemes in Latin America originated 
in categorical targeting requiring minimal information—attendance in schools and 
maternity clinics. This was part of the original design of Mexico’s  Progresa / 
 Oportunidades program that is considered to be the prototype of successful condi-
tional cash transfers (Coady and Harris  2001 ). 6 Applications elsewhere have begun 
to focus on asset and income tests that are harder to combine, and that may generate 
additional disincentives. 
 In a multi-year context, a repeated-games framework would permit the operation 
of competition for funds across local governments, especially for physical invest-
ments and where the sanction to withhold future funds is credible (Ahmad  2009 ). 
This form of clientelism may occur with the more complex and information 
intensive conditional cash transfers, as seen in the Indian subcontinent. In principle, 
reaching the poor by offering limited fi nancial incentives and requiring a person’s 
time are better categorical targeting mechanisms. However, fi nancing from higher 
levels together with poor information fl ows may contribute to the diffi culties of 
effective targeting with the Indian NREGA and the social action campaigns being 
launched may lack the informational basis to be truly effective. 
18.4  Concluding Remarks 
 In the absence of genuine local interest in providing for the marginalized and 
extremely poor, direct provision of funding by central governments and aid agencies 
appears to be the only feasible option, which may be refl ected by the increasing popu-
larity of centrally sourced conditional cash transfers, such as the  Oportunidades pro-
gram in Mexico or the  Bolsa project in Brazil. In the Brazilian case, there is adequate 
generation of basic information on a standardized basis, but that is not the case in 
Mexico (or Pakistan for that matter, see Ahmad  in process ). In such cases using 
simple categorical targeting mechanisms, women through clinics or girls’ through 
schools, as vehicles for targeting may be more effective. Similarly public works with 
limited fi nancial incentives (based on the 1970s Maharashtra model, see Agarwal 
 1991 ) could be an alternative, especially if the community and the targeted margina-
lized groups are able to identify the areas where public works may be most useful. 
 In the fi nal analysis the diffi culty lies with incomplete information on need 
and on the actual spending that is available to central governments and donors. 
6 
 However, fi nancing mechanisms for  Oportunidades relied on payroll taxes, which in the presence 
of labor market informality and evasion, may accentuate disincentives and lower growth potential 
(Levy  2008 ). 
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Local governments may have better knowledge about need, but may lack the incen-
tives to provide for the marginalized or extremely poor, and indeed may use the lack 
of basic information to divert resources. While much depends on individual circum-
stances and institutional arrangements available, in all cases the incentive structures 
are important and the interplay between policy instruments needs to be kept in 
mind. Above all the basic building blocks for good governance, the ability to track 
the funds, and the outcomes of public spending remain as important as individual 
interventions. 
 Open Access  This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 
Noncommercial License, which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in 
any medium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited. 
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